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From 211900DAUG04 to 221900DAUG04

## I MEF Situation Report

DTG: 222200DAUG04

1. **Commander's Assessment:** MNF-W continues shaping operations to isolate MM in the Imam Ali Mosque Complex and attrite the enemy. Recent reporting indicates that MM are leaving the Imam Ali Mosque complex and moving toward Al Kufah. In an effort to deny MM a safe haven in Kufah, MNF-W will shift the focus of operations to Al Kufah. Company and battalion sized raids and limited objective attacks will be utilized to break the fighting spirit of the MM while continuing to attrite MM members. Operations in the last 24 hours were successful in disrupting MM forces and destroying them in zone. TF 1-5 CAV with support from BLT 1/4 conducted a movement to contact raid on a parking garage west of Imam Ali Mosque. The lead elements neutralized 11 IEDs enroute to the objective. Friendly forces engaged PID MM targets with tank main gun, 20mm, 25mm, 40mm, 7.62mm and Hellfire. AC-130 on station covered the retrograde and prosecuted targets of opportunity on the western end of the parking garage and surrounding buildings. There where no friendly casualties reported while BDA on the MM was estimated at 35 EKIA. To date, MNF-W estimates EKIA at 1141. Despite the increasing enemy casualty count, we assess that an estimated 300-500 radical supporters of Sadr remain at the Imam Ali Mosque and will fight to their death. Operations continue to reduce the combat effectiveness of MM and validate enemy security posture and routes to and from the objective area. MNF-W continues planning and rehearsals for an attack.

In Fallujah, periodic precise targeting of AIF elements with CAS has begun to separate the AIF and FF elements from the local Iraqi populace. Fallujans are anxious to rid their city of AIF and FF elements. There is some evidence that tribal groups are attacking FF elements, but intimidation and coercion have prevented widespread citizen opposition to AIF activities. While military action to kill or capture AIF and FF elements in Fallujah may be inevitable, right now continued precision strikes into the city to destroy AIF and FF is providing near term successes. In Ramadi, AIF activity has been slightly reduced due to 1MARDIV surge offensive operations to cordon and sweep the areas surrounding Ar Ramadi to disrupt AIF activity. Shohwani Special Forces on patrol in a marketplace in east Ramadi were attacked by small arms fire from a vehicle traveling west on MSR Michigan. The patrol returned fire, however, the vehicle escaped. Two Shohwani Special Forces were WIA.

TF B/1-32 IN conducted Operation GOLD RUSH in Amiriyah in order to kill or capture three suspected IED emplacements. One of the three targets was detained.

In AO Denver we continue to see an increase in violent IED and mine attacks on MNF. TF 3/7 patrol observed a man crouching on the roof of a residence belonging to (b) (6), a 3/7 HVT target, on the eastern side of Al Karabilah. The patrol conducted a snap cordon and search and detained the individual who is believed to be (b) (6). A search of the house uncovered weapons, hand grenades, and IED making materials. 1st LAR detained (b) (6), because of an IED that was placed in view of his house, resulting in damage to a 1st LAR vehicle. This was the fourth IED attack that had occurred in the immediate vicinity of the Sheik's house. Due to the isolated nature of the attack area, the Sheik is believed to be complicit in the attacks. The Sheik had been warned after the third attack that he would be detained if another occurred.

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In the next 24-48 hours, 24 MEU will continue to provide security for TF Shield around downed powerline near the Musayyib power plant and conduct counter-IED patrols to prevent enemy attacks. 24 MEU also will secure the 18" oil pipeline repair site in the vicinity of Iskandariyah until repairs are complete and the reserves at the Musayyib power plant are filled. RCT-1 continues military operations around Fallujah and continues to reconstitute what is left of the Fallujah ISF. In the west, TF 2/7 and TF 1/23 ADVON continue RIP coordination. 1st LAR continues operations north of the Euphrates River in order to capture or kill IED and mine emplacements. TF 2/7 and Small Craft Company conduct sweeps along the Euphrates River between Camp Hit and the City of Hit to find caches and AIF infiltrators.

### Intelligence Overview of the AO

- **AO Raleigh:** Recent reporting indicates a large percentage of Fallujans resent the continued presence of FF and other AIF elements in the city. The murder of LtCol Sulayman appears to have convinced many people that insurgents and criminals identifying themselves as Mujahadeen are the true enemies of the people, not the MNF. While some Iraqis have reportedly formed vigilante groups to combat the AIF, most citizens continue to be intimidated by Mujahadeen inside the city. MNF aerial attacks have caused collateral damage in some neighborhoods, but most people hold the AIF, not the MNF, responsible for the destruction. By one account, many Fallujans hope that additional aerial bombardments will occur. (b)(1)1.4(c) and sensitive reporting suggests that Fallujans, both good and bad, believe an MNF attack is imminent and many families have fled to the countryside. A large number of refugees are reportedly staying in Habbaniyah. Believing that the MNF will target the Industrial Area, enemy leaders like (b) (6) have reportedly fortified this zone with VBIEDs, IEDs and fighting positions.
- **AO North Babil:** The deteriorating situation in Fallujah has prompted some AIF to seek refuge in North Babil. Cities like Yusifiyah and Mahmudiyah are short commutes away from Fallujah, and the local population is heavily influenced by Wahabbism; thereby making North Babil a potential safe-haven for the terrorists. Recent reporting indicates that the terrorists have a three-stage strategy to increase their power and gain operational freedom in North Babil: 1) attack local IP stations to weaken regional security, 2) discredit IIG and local government officials, 3) conduct attacks against MNF convoys.
- **AO South:** The situation in Najaf remains tense, and there are conflicting reporting as to what degree the MM have evacuated the Imam Ali Shrine. There is still MM activity reported IVO the Shrine, but at a much lower level than we have been seeing the past two weeks. The 11th MEU has maintained continuous ISR coverage over the shrine and multiple checkpoints around the exclusion zone, but the sheer numbers of people make it difficult to ascertain who may have left the mosque.
- **AO Topeka:** 1BCT detained (b) (6), during a daytime raid of his residence yesterday. He is being held on charges of corruption and collaboration with the AIF. Recent reporting also indicates that he may have had a role in the abduction of former (b) (6). According to preliminary reporting, the arrest was carried out with no incident, and the MNF has confiscated about 40 documents for exploitation, a computer and photocopies of passports.
- **AO Denver:** Friday's prayer services at an unidentified mosque in Sa'dah were anti-MNF, with the imam calling on fellow Muslims to stop fighting each other and instead attack the Americans. The imam said that Muslims from other countries were taking part in the battles;

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therefore, the Iraqi people should similarly confront the Americans (See current I MEF INTSUM for further details).

## 2. Current Ops

### • 1<sup>st</sup> MarDiv

- **Commander's Assessment:** Falluja and Ramadi are inextricably linked. Falluja is the symbol of Jihad and Ramadi is its prize. AIF in Falluja are currently convinced by the continuing RCT-1 movements around the city that an MNF assault is looming. For this reason, the AIF have chosen to husband their personnel and materiel to face this attack. As this perception fades, the enemy is likely to resume normal anti-MNF operations in the outlying areas, Ramadi and Baghdad.

MNF pressure on AIF has also driven the enemy to weaker targets: the ISF, IP and ING units in AO Denver and Northern Babil are attacked on a daily basis. In Ramadi, there have been two assassinations of Iraqi Police officers in the last week. In Ramadi's case, such attacks are carried out to demoralize/discredit an already weak and compromised security force and create an air of instability and danger that AIF hope will lead to an eventual removal of MNF from the city.

In our western sector the enemy is likely conducting an offensive centered on increased IED and IDF use along ASR Uranium and parts of Bronze with particular attention to the areas where they intersect. (b)(1)1.4(c) indicates that they have conserved their resources in order to strike MNF in this area during the on-going relief in place.

Based on the reporting to date, the threat in Northern Babil is made up of disparate AIF cells based on familial, religious, or former Iraqi military ties. Scant reporting connects these cells to each other or to broader AIF networks such as AMZ or FRE.

Today was the first meeting between Gen Natonski and the Governor. The governor spoke at length about security issues and the need for strong leadership by IP and ING commanders. He indicated that he is still in the process of forming his governmental staff. His other major concern was the employment of young college educated men. Listed below are the main points discussed/or brought up by (b) (6) during the meeting:

- Governor noted that General Shakir was a weak Bde Commander, and had been replaced by General Kathem Faris, who was strong and doing a good job.
- He noted that (b) (6) was also weak, and his "irresponsible behavior" led to his being incarcerated. He was curious to know whom the Ministry of the Interior would appoint to replace him, as he had not been able to find out.
- Reaffirmed that people were happy that (b) (6) had been incarcerated
- He also said that the interim (b) (6), wouldn't be able to maintain his post as the interim (b) (6) for very long due to family commitments
- Discovered a lot of chaos in the time since he'd been in office, with many people doing other peoples' jobs, and wanted to make sure everyone "stayed in their lane."
- He said he met with city mayors and directors general regularly.
- Governor stressed the importance of "finding jobs" for people, especially university graduates, as they would be fodder for the AIF recruiting effort.

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Operating Principle Reminder: Apr-Oct is the insect/disease season in Iraq. The most common insect-borne disease in our AO is Leishmaniasis, which is transmitted by sandflies and results in a lingering skin rash. In the past year, over 600 Coalition personnel have contracted this skin infection; many required evacuation for treatment. Commanders ensure you take the following measures to prevent Leishmaniasis, and other insect-borne diseases: wear sleeves down, treat uniforms with Permethrin, use DEET on exposed skin, and protect sleeping quarters with netting, screens, etc. Leadership and supervision are essential to ensure that 1 MARDIV personnel are protected from insect borne diseases.

Blue Diamond recognizes the sacrifice of: Cpl Christopher W. Belchik, 2d Bn, 2nd Marines (24th MEU), 1st Marine Division, KIA 22 august 2004 from IED, Mahmudiyah, Iraq.

- **Actions during previous 24 hours**

- Division HQ: CG met with (b) (6) at Blue Diamond today.
- Security and sustainment operations (SASO), CA operations and Information Operations (IO) ISO IIG and ISF.
- 1BCT is Main Effort.
- Conducted a demonstration with tanks on the northwest and the southeast of Falluja IOT relieve pressure on 1-32 as they conducted "WAGON TRAIN."
- 2/1, supported by CAG, HET, TPT, combat camera, and Iraqi Special Forces, conducted a CMO patrol.
- ING CP-18 was reported overrun by AIF after the ING surrendered their weapons.
- Provides security ISO of Army units conducting repairs on the 18" oil pipeline.
- 1stLt Abraham Afnael of the Baghdad Police was found dead in Mahmudiyah by the ING.

- 3d MAW

- **Commander's Assessment:** SAFIRE reporting must be accurate as to the distinction between small arms and AAA. Each type is visually distinct and each type poses a different threat to aircraft and mission planning. In addition, reporting inaccurate information will have secondary effects external to IMEF, for example, joint air assets will utilize the information as reported and adjust their support according to the specific threat reported. Accurate reporting is key to maintaining current levels of IMEF and joint levels of air support. Ensure reporting, from whatever source, is accurate as to type threat so we can best utilize the intelligence information for effective mission support.

- 1<sup>st</sup> FSSG

- **Commander's Assessment:** Steady state CSS operations across the AO today. STP 2 completed displacement to FOB Duke last night IOT support 11th MEU. Remaining pallets of Class V for 11th MEU were transported by 593d CSG. We had the opportunity to host BGen Fontaine, CG of 1st COSCOM this afternoon providing him an overview of the 1st FSSG as well as an orientation to the Supply Management Unit/Intermediate Supply Activity and the Repairable Maintenance Company. He was also able to visit the 298th Corps Support Battalion. Believe visit went well and we were able to lay the foundation for a solid logistics partnership upon their RIP with the 13th COSCOM. Camp Taqaddum is also hosting the CG 4th Marine Aircraft Wing tonight. Will meet ACMC tonight upon his arrival at Taqaddum.

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- MEG

- **Commander's Assessment:** Our inability to meet with the local water, sewage, electricity and roads and bridges engineers has negatively impacted our ability to continue CMO contracting efforts in support of RCT-1 CAG for the areas surrounding Fallujah. We have been relying on these engineers to provide lists of needed projects along with scopes of work for our contract execution. As such, we will be depending upon the Governate in Ramadi to provide infrastructure projects and scopes of work for execution. That will likely result in the areas surrounding Fallujah receiving fewer resources.

This past week we saw a marked decrease in contracting activity at the FLT. Many contractors, consulting engineers and engineer representatives from the city did not show for scheduled meetings and could not be reached by mobile phone. In addition, the environment has precluded us from making contract awards for the ING 505th BN HQ project (just east of Fallujah), and the Abu Ghurayb electrical upgrades project. This is consistent with the apparent message sent last week by the Mujahadeen that anyone doing business with the Coalition at the FLT would be killed – “no exceptions.”

While significant resources are dedicated to protecting key government officials throughout Iraq, we will have to establish a level of security for other government officials, and the contractors who are brave enough to work with us, in order to effectively rebuild the infrastructure and the economy.

The engineer assessment from NAVFAC Atlantic on the damage to the MSR Mobile overpass just North of the Cloverleaf indicated that traffic can continue on the bridge, but must be restricted to two lanes per direction to prevent additional sagging/deterioration of the damaged sections of the bridge. This is a post tension concrete bridge and the repairs to return the structure to previous capacity are not trivial in nature. We are evaluating simple methods to transfer loads among the remaining bridge stringers or over-bridging (Maybe (b) (6) ), but more permanent repairs will need to be undertaken by contractors capable of highway bridge construction. Any additional attacks on this structure will likely make it unsuitable for traffic and have a major impact on logistics in western Iraq.

- 3rd CAG

- **Commander's Comments:** Attempting to find a source of CERP funds for CA team at Abu Ghurayb prison. The area immediately surrounding Abu Ghurayb is divided between I MEF and 1st CD. The prison itself has no CERP budget. I MEF has engaged MNCI in attempt to provide an independent CERP budget.

- **Critical Commodity Areas**

- FUELS

- The fuel levels for Al Anbar will continue to be low according to the Ministry of Oil. They are intentionally keeping fuel stocks low and are only pushing enough fuel to the area to meet daily demand and are making no attempt to build stockade at this time due to security issues. There is a big risk of black marketing of fuels in the Al Anbar province and a bigger risk of loss of fuel to destruction by insurgent forces because security is not very good at the depots. The Ministry prefers keeping most of its fuel stocks closer to Baghdad and pushing out fuel as it is required.

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- PUBLIC HEALTH

- The US Army left 66 pallets of medical supplies as humanitarian aid. These have not been inventoried, but still will be shipped to TQ. The tentative plan is to inventory the supplies and co-ordinate with the DGs of Health in Najaf and Al-Anbar in order to understand their needs.
- The teaching hospital in Najaf will under go refurbishment and repairs of infrastructure and will be done by the Parsons Construction Group. Emergency work will commence on 22 August with a 21-day performance period. A list of needed medical supplies has been assembled and prioritized.

### 3. Last 24 Hours

#### **222007DAUG04 IED Attack on 3/1 Patrol N of Fallujah**

I/3/1 reports a mounted patrol was attacked with an IED, 4.5km north of Fallujah. There were (2) FWIA (urgent and routine) who were ground-MedEvac to Camp Fallujah.

#### **221618DAUG04 2-7 CAV Receives Sniper Fire in Najaf**

2-7 CAV received sniper fire from multiple buildings to the east of the exclusion circle in Najaf. CAS was provided to support the soldiers and they directed fires on all four buildings. The Apaches called in for CAS reported to have expended (6) Hellfire, (90) 30mm rounds and (4) rockets. BDA: all targets were destroyed and unknown enemy KIA.

#### **221327DAUG04 SAF Attack on Shohwani SF Patrol in Ramadi**

G/2/4 reports a Shohwani Special Forces (SSF) patrol in a marketplace in East Ramadi received SAF from a vehicle traveling west on MSR Michigan. The patrol returned fire, however, the vehicle escaped. There were (2) SSF WIA (Urgent and Priority). The WIA were ground-MedEvac to Camp Combat Outpost and then air-MedEvac to Camp TQ. An additional Shohwani soldier accompanied the WIA to Camp TQ.

#### **220945DAUG04 3/7 Conducts Snap Cordon & Search in Karabilah**

A 3/7 patrol observed a man crouching on the roof of a residence belonging to (b) (6) a 3/7 HVT target, on the eastern side of Al Karabilah. The patrol conducted a snap cordon and search and detained (1) individual, suspected to be (b) (6) (1) Hand grenade, (1) AK-47, (1) MP-5, IED making materials (unspecified) and (2) artillery fuses were seized. HET is questioning the man.

#### **220305DAUG04 1-5 CAV AC-130 Engagement on Mortar Position in Najaf**

Bravo 1-5 CAV came under indirect fire. AC-130 acquired the target and it plotted inside the NFA. MNC-I was contacted via I MEF and permission was granted for a Hellfire shot. Predator could not acquire the target and AC-130 was cleared by MNC-I and MEF to engage. AC-130 engaged with 2 EKIA and 1 Mortar tube destroyed.

#### **220205DAUG04 2/2 Patrol Attacked with IED In North Mahmudiyah**

E/2/2 patrol struck an IED on ASR Jackson, in north Mahmudiyah. Patrol reports (1) FKIA and (3) FWIA ((1) Urgent and (2) Routine). MedEvac in process. UPDATE AT 220441D AUG 04: 2/2 reports a total of (4) FWIA: (1) Urgent, (1) Priority and (2) Routine. 220317D the (1) urgent FWIA and (1) priority FWIA were MedEvac to the 31st CSH. The (2) routine FWIA are being treated at Camp Mahmudiyah.

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## 4. Next 24 Hours

- 1<sup>st</sup> MarDiv
  - SASO, CA and IO ISO IIG and ISF. Continue enduring operations.
  - 1BCT is Main Effort.
  - Continues to seize all vehicles, weapons, ID cards & badges that members of the illegitimate Falluja IPS bring through the checkpoint to send the message MNF does not recognize the IPS who claim to be keeping the peace in Falluja.
  - Conducts "TRUE GRIT," a movement to contact in the southern portion of Ramadi, on 23 August.
  - Continues drawdown of Marines from Haditha IP station with the removal of 7 Marines.
  - Continues to secure the damaged portion of the 18" oil pipeline until repairs are completed.

## 5. Major Unit Locations

Unit	Location	Grid
I MEF CP	Camp Al-Fallujah	(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(7)(f)
MEG CP	Camp Al-Fallujah	(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(7)(f)
1 <sup>st</sup> Mar Div CP	Camp Blue Diamond HC	(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(7)(f)
RCT 7 CP	Camp Al-Asad	(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(7)(f)
RCT 1 CP	Camp Al-Fallujah	(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(7)(f)
1/1 BCT	Camp Ar Ramadi	(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(7)(f)
3 <sup>rd</sup> MAW	Camp Al Asad	(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(7)(f)
1 <sup>st</sup> FSSG CP	Camp Taqaddum	(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(7)(f)
CSSG-15	Camp Taqaddum	(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(7)(f)
CSSG-11	Camp Blue Diamond HC	(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(7)(f)

## 6. Combat Power (Air)

AH-1W	UH-1N	CH-46E	CH-53E	FA-18D	KC-130	AV-8B	RQ-2B	UC-35
35/27	17/15	60/47	23/16	12/11	6/4	16/11	8/8	1/1
75%	88%	78%	69%	92%	67%	69%	100%	100%

## Combat Power (Ground) (USMC)

HMMWV TOW	HMMWV HARDBACK	AAV FOV	LAV FOV	TANK COMBAT	HOWZITZER M198
118/107	509/485	107/93	127/116	42/37	30/29
91%	95%	87%	91%	88%	97%

## Combat Power (Ground) (Army)

M1/A1/A2	M2/A1/A2	M1064	M109A6	SCOUT HMMWV
14/14	30/28	8/8	6/6	144/142
100%	93%	100%	100%	99%

Declassified By: M. J. PEREZ, COS, Per CCR 380-14 &amp; MARCENTO 5513.1B, Date: 20210917